Casual observation of faculty searches by economics departments indicates that some departments search primarily in a narrow subfield, while others search in several general or even all fields. In this paper we ask: What is the optimal search scope for a recruiting department? And second, do departments search optimally? We develop a simple search model in which optimal search scope is shown to increase in department quality. Using data from Job Openings for Economists, we find that higher-ranked departments do conduct broader searches. We correct for measurement error in department rankings by instrumenting a reputation-based ranking with a publication-based ranking. We find that a 10-place difference in department ranking is associated with 3.5-4.8 more JEL subfields listed in a position announcement.
Introduction
When an economics department decides to recruit new faculty, it must decide in which fields to conduct the search. Casual observation suggests that the scope of recruiting searches varies widely, with some departments searching primarily in a narrow subfield and others searching in several general or even all fields. It is generally recognized that the very top departments tend to engage in very wide "best athlete" searches. Among departments that engage in narrower searches, on the other hand, it is not uncommon to hear complaints ex post that the search should have been broader. Is it therefore the case that these departments are making a sub-optimal choice to search narrowly? It would seem, however, that economic departments, more so than other departments, should be making economically rational decisions when choosing search scope.
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In this paper we develop a simple model of how economics departments can optimally choose search scope in faculty recruiting. We show that the optimal search scope is increasing in the quality rank of the department. We use postings in Job Openings for Economists (JOE) to estimate the relationship between department rank and search scope and find that higher-ranked departments engage in broader searches than lower-ranked departments. The relationship is robust to the exclusion of the top-ranked departments from the sample. Since there is some debate about how well various department rankings reflect true department quality, we instrument a reputationbased ranking with a publication-based ranking to correct for measurement error. We find that a 10-place difference in department ranking is associated with 3.3-4.6 more Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) subfields in a position announcement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model, Section 3 discusses the data and presents our empirical analysis and Section 4 concludes. 1 Previous research has shown that economists are more likely to exhibit behavior predicted by a rational economic model than non-economists (Maxwell and Ames, 1981) .
The Model
We consider a simple model that focuses on a department's decision in choosing the number of fields to search and show that the optimal number of fields searched is increasing in department quality. Other work on employer search has noted the benefits to some employers of broadening the applicant pool. Much like our finding that departments with higher quality standards will search more broadly, Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) show that employers will search over more candidates and/or more intensively if the education requirements for the position are high. Barron, Berger and Black (1997) argue that there is greater variation in productivity at higher levels of human capital; therefore it is optimal for employers searching for workers with more formal education to spend more on search. Lang (1991) shows that employers for whom a job vacancy is the most costly will offer a higher wage, therefore increasing the number of prospective applicants.
Because the need to decide ex ante the fields to advertise in JOE largely precludes the use of sequential search methods (e.g. Stigler, 1961; Morgan, 1983; Weitzman, 1979) , our model is essentially a fixed-sample-size search problem. A key feature of our model is that each department has a quality cut-off that reflects the department's ranking. Higher ranked departments will have a higher quality cut-off. Applications below this cut-off are thrown out without cost, and applications above the cut-off are reviewed more extensively with some positive cost.
2 Therefore, if a high-ranked department with a high quality cut-off searches narrowly, it may not receive any applications above its cut-off. In addition, because the higher-ranked department can ignore most applications without cost, the cost involved in expanding the search to other fields is lower than those incurred by lower-ranked departments with lower cut-offs. These two effects will be 2 Alternatively, we can think that when an applicant sees the ad of a department, he will not apply if his quality is below the department's cut-off. We, however, wish to avoid modeling strategic decisions of applicants.
important in explaining why a higher-ranked department is better off expanding its search to more fields. The department reviews each application with at cost c to determine the true quality level.
Intuitively, one can think of the department doing an initial "quick sort" of applications into two piles, one of which will be discarded and the other reviewed in more detail in order to determine how the applicants in that pile rank relative to each other. We assume that the department has perfect and costless information on the binary outcome of whether the applicant is above or below the quality cut-off, so that every application discarded is in fact below the cut-off and every application reviewed meets the cut-off.
After reviewing the applications above the cut-off, the department then makes an offer to the applicant with the highest quality. We assume that an applicant accepts an offer from a department of quality k with probability k, so the better the reputation of the department, the more likely an applicant will accept an offer from that department. For simplicity, we do not allow the department to make repeated or sequential offers, nor allow the department to make an offer to an applicant of lower quality in order to increase the probability of acceptance.
Without loss of generality, assume that a department, if it searches at all, searches fields 1,..., i= m m where 1 . Let Q be the quality of the applicant from field i and Q represent the highest quality application received by the department:
where the probability distribution of each Q i is:
We will find it mathematically convenient to define a quality variable that is censored at the department's quality cut-off, k:
It seems natural that a department's surplus from recruiting an applicant of quality q, conditional on the applicant accepting the offer, should be proportional to q-k. This term clearly needs to be standardized by quality rank; otherwise the returns to performing any search will be negligibly small for the very highest ranked departments. We thus assume this surplus to be
Notice that by our assumption, for any k (0,1) ∈ , the surplus equals 0 if the quality of the new hire is equal to the department's k and equal to1 if the quality of the new hire is 1. Notice, also, that this surplus is decreasing in k. Thus, for any given value of q, lower-ranked departments will receive the greater surplus.
Since the offer from a department of rank k is accepted with probability k, the department's search benefit is values of q, the benefit in both cases is zero. Between .4 and .6, only the lower-ranked department receives positive benefit. For values of q just above .6, the lower-ranked department still receives the larger benefit because the difference between q and k is so much greater. Because the slope of the function is steeper for higher-ranked departments, reflecting the fact that candidates are more likely to accept their offer, the high-ranked department receives the larger benefit at high values of q.
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The department's payoff from searching m fields is therefore
where n is the number of applications that are above the quality cut-off and are therefore actually reviewed by the department at cost c per person. 4 Obviously, n m ≤ .
Then, the probability distribution of is
and the expected quality of the top applicant, given there is at least one applicant above the quality cut-off is:
Therefore, the expected quality of the top applicant from the search of m fields is:
3 Likewise, the result of Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) requires that the higher the education requirements for the position, the greater the value of an increment in the applicant's ability. This greater return to an increase in applicant quality is a critical presumption to the finding in both models that employers with higher standards will search more broadly. 4 Because the department does not know the actual quality of the applicant (beyond that it is at least k), it cannot choose to review applications based on more detailed information about the applicants' qualities. 
Thus the expected payoff for a department of rank k from searching m fields is 
where we define ∆ − , and ∆ < . It is therefore optimal for higher-ranked departments to search more broadly across economics fields than lower-ranked departments. A broader search is optimal for higher-ranked departments because of three factors. First, higher-ranked departments have higher quality standards. It is therefore likely that a narrow search may fail to produce an applicant of sufficient quality. Second, because a higher-ranked department will dispose of more applications without cost, the cost of expanding the search to more fields is lower than that experienced by lower-ranked departments. Third, while the surplus for hiring a candidate of any particular quality is higher for lower-ranked departments, the probability an applicant will accept an offer from the department is higher for higher-ranked departments. This prevents the search benefit to lower-ranked departments from universally dominating the search benefit to higher-ranked departments.
We note that the simple model we have presented abstracts away from some potentially important components of the search process. For instance, faculty members in a department may have different opinions about which field has the highest need for a new hire and which candidate has the highest quality. When several fields are listed for the search, the candidate to be hired may depend on both quality and field, reflecting coalitions within the department on what the department's needs are. 6 We avoid modeling the possible strategic behavior within the department by assuming that the department is able to reach a consensus on the measurement of the quality of candidate.
We also note that, because our simple model omits many features of what is actually a very complex process, it is easy to offer alternative explanations that would also generate a relationship between department quality and search scope. For example, higher-ranked departments could have better personal connections to other departments and greater expertise that allow them to evaluate the quality of applicants with lower costs. In addition, lower-ranked departments tend to exist in lower-ranked universities and these universities are sometimes less supportive of broad-based recruiting searches. Furthermore, higher-ranked departments are often larger and have a broader range of fields represented among their faculty. As a result, these departments can recruit over a broader range of fields and still find candidates that match with the interests of the current department faculty. We do not dispute that there might be differences in institutional structure, information or preferences between higher-ranked and lower-ranked departments that influence search behavior. Our model, however, shows that one can generate a relationship between search scope and department quality without assuming these sorts of inherent differences between departments. We further believe that the intuition behind the result of our model, that of the thinness of the market and free disposal of low-quality applications for high-quality departments, reflects key features of real-life search behavior on the part of economics faculty.
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There is one specific, alternative model that we deal with directly in our empirical analysis.
Lower-ranked departments, particularly smaller departments, might find it advantageous to specialize in a few fields in order to build up a strong reputation in one or two specializations.
These departments will tend to engage in narrower searches for reasons other than those implied by our model. Specifically, these departments will be considering match-quality, how well the candidates' research interests are aligned with those of the department, as well as absolute quality.
In our empirical analysis, we create a measure of department concentration across fields based on publication output. We find that the relationship between department rank and breadth of search is robust to the inclusion of this control variable.
7 For simplicity we have not considered the behavior of the labor market where matching and sorting between departments and applicants take place. Gan and Li (2002) focus on this issue and make the point that even holding the ratio of candidates to positions constant, a match will be more likely in thicker markets with more candidates and more positions. While in our model the department benefits from an expanded search due to the increase in the number of applications, Gan and Li's result suggests that there is an additional benefit of placing the department's search in a thicker market.
Empirical Analysis
There has been a small amount of empirical research done on the search behavior of employers. Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) and Barron, Berger and Black (1997) confirm empirically that employers search more extensively (over more candidates) when the education requirements for the job are higher. There has been little formal analysis of search behavior of economists. Gan and Li (2002) use JOE listings from 1999-2000 to investigate the probability of a job vacancy filling in a "thicker" field versus a "thinner" field and find that job vacancies are more likely to be filled in fields with a larger number of positions and candidates, even if the ratio of candidates to positions is constant. In a less formal study, Carson and Navarro (1988) report the results of a survey of economics departments concerning their recruiting practices. Their results provide some preliminary support for our hypothesis in that they find that only 24% of top 20 departments report that a candidate's fields of specialization are of great importance in the decision to schedule an interview compared to 61% of 380 other departments. In fact, 35% of top 20 departments reported that field was of slight or no importance compared to only 6% of the other economics departments.
The data used in our empirical analysis are collected from the October and November issues of JOE from 1997-2000. The October and November issues are used for two reasons. First, these two issues contain the vast majority of job announcements for tenure-track or tenured positions in research-oriented departments, which are the focus of our analysis. Second, JOE does not allow departments to list the same announcement two months in a row, so we can be sure that our data set does not contain duplicate observations for the same position opening. We limit our sample on several different dimensions. The purpose of these sample selection criteria are to exclude announcements that by their very nature are more likely to involve a narrower search. We exclude lower-ranked departments, because the fact that they tend to be teaching-oriented changes the interpretation of the field listings. For example, a research-oriented department might list several fields in their announcement indicating that they are willing to look at applicants with research interests in any of those fields. In contrast, a teaching-oriented department might list several fields to indicate that they need someone who can teach courses in all of those fields.
We obtain rankings of economics departments from four different sources. The 1993
National Research Council (NRC) rankings of 107 departments and the 1998 US News and World
Report rankings of 62 departments are both based on surveys of economics faculty. These two reputation-based rankings have a Spearman's rank correlation coefficient of .96. We also consider two rankings based on journal publications. Scott and Mitias (1996) would be useful to use this alternative ranking as a robustness check. Unfortunately, with only 50 departments included in the ranking, its use substantially limits our sample size.
For our initial analysis, we consider whether or not a department conducts a broad "Any
Field" (AF) search. In the first two columns of Table 1, We compare the average NRC rankings of these two groups in the columns 4 and 5 of Table   1 . It is striking that the average rankings of those departments who qualify their AF search are relatively close to the average rankings of the departments who do not conduct an AF search at all.
The average NRC ranking of the AF qualified group ranges from 44.9 to 51.1. In comparison, the average ranking of departments who do not qualify their AF search ranges from 13.6 to 25.9. The difference in the means between these two groups is significant at the .01 level in three of the four years. Therefore, this analysis indicates that higher-ranked departments are more likely to conduct broad AF searches, and in particular, higher-ranked departments are more likely to list AF as their search code without further clarification.
For our regression analysis, the unit of observation is a position announcement. Many departments post multiple announcements because they are recruiting for more than one position.
Our regression analysis is appropriately weighted to account for the fact that departments advertising more positions have more observations in the data. If a position announcement advertises multiple positions and it is clear which of the listed fields are intended for which positions, the position announcement is separated out into multiple observations. Because some announcements cannot be decomposed this way, we control for the number of positions advertised in the announcement in some of our analysis below.
In order to more fully use the information in the announcement, we construct a measure of search scope based on all of the fields listed in the posting. In the JEL classification system, there There are some obvious limitations to our search scope measure. The University of Hawaii example above was chosen specifically to illustrate this limitation. First of all, the announcement lists C1-Econometrics, which only adds .01 to the search size even though econometrics is a large field. Some announcements list C0-Econometrics as opposed to C1, which would generate a larger search scope value. In addition, while the ad lists C1, J0 and F0 as JEL codes, the text of the ad indicates that the department wants an econometrician who has labor or international as a secondary field. In this case, the scope of the search is somewhat narrower than the JEL listings imply. Despite this limitation, we are reluctant to introduce a substantial subjective component into our analysis by trying to incorporate the additional information provided in the text of the ads.
It is also the case that the final outcome of a search might be very different from what was indicated in the department's ad. We do not have data on the final outcome of the search, so we assume that the ad placed by the department is an indicator of that department's true intent. 10 We 9 Our search scope measure essentially weights each general field by the number of subfields listed in the JEL
classifications. An announcement for a small general field (such as KO-Law and Economics or IO-Health, Education and Welfare, whichhave 4 and 3 subfield, respectively) will therefore have a narrower search scope measure than a position announcement for a large general field (such as CO-Mathematical and Quantitative Methods or DOMicroeconomics, each of which has 9 subfields). We experimented with an alternative weighting scheme in which each general field was weighted by the fraction of 1999 JOE announcements listing that field. The correlation between the search scope measure obtained using these weights and our original search scope measure was .99, so we restricted our analysis to the original measure. 10 In many cases, due to equal employment/affirmative action rules, it is difficult for a department to hire in fields outside those listed in its JOE ad.
only need to assume that departments that intend broader searchers typically place ads that generate larger search scope values.
In Figure 2 , we plot our search scope variable against the department's NRC ranking for the 531 observations in our data set. Figure 2 shows that most department searches are fairly narrow.
The median search, among non-AF searches, has a search scope value of .09 (the size of a larger general field). The 25 th percentile is .04 (the size of a small general field), and the 75 th percentile is .18. There is a clear negative correlation between search scope and NRC rank. As was suggested by Table 1 , the AF searches are clustered at the higher ranks. What Figure 2 reveals, however, is that even ignoring the AF searches, there still appears to be a negative relationship between search scope and department rank.
In the first column of we observe in our sample that is .73. We therefore take this value as our censoring point.
In Table 3 , we report sample means for all variables used in our Tobit analysis. We report both unweighted and weighted means. The weights are designed to equalize weight across economics departments, adjusting for the fact that departments place different numbers of ads and therefore have different numbers of observations in the data. These weights are used in all our multivariate analysis.
In Table 4 , we report the results of our Tobit analysis. The dependent variable is search scope. Control variables include indicator variables for whether or not the department is located in a business school or in a private university, indicator variables for whether the position is advertised as joint with another department, a junior-level search, a senior-level search (omitted category is open-rank search), a measure of department size and year effects.
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One control variable, publication concentration, requires some additional explanation. This variable is intended to proxy for the extent to which a department specializes in a subset of fields. The first column of Table 4 reports the results of our baseline Tobit analysis. There is a statistically significant negative coefficient of -.0036 for NRC Rank, indicating that high-ranked departments tend to have broader searches. In addition, announcements from departments in business schools and announcements for joint positions tend to be narrower in scope. Larger departments tend to have broader searches. The only counter-intuitive sign is that for the logarithm of the publication concentration measure. It is positive, indicating that more concentrated departments have broader searches. This coefficient is very imprecisely measured and would better be interpreted as a finding of no relationship independent of department size and rank. in a single job announcement without assigning specific fields to each position that the fields for multiple positions will be included in a single observation. A department that advertises three positions and only indicates that all three positions will be filled from a broad set of fields is arguably engaging in a much broader search than a department that advertises three separate narrow searches. Therefore, controlling for the number of positions advertised in an announcement in part controls for one dimension on which departments can broaden their search. As a result, we report results with and without this control variable.
The results with the positions variable included are reported in the second column of Table   4 . This variable is coded to equal one if only one position will be filled for that announcement, two if two positions are available and three if more than two positions are available. 13 As expected, the positions variable is positive and significant, indicating that announcements intended to fill multiple vacancies advertise in more fields than those intended to fill a single vacancy. The magnitude of the effect of department rank is diminished from -.0036 to -.0029.
The results in Table 4 could largely reflect the behavior of the top few departments. It is well known that a number of the top departments, such as Harvard, Yale and University of Chicago, tend to conduct ''best-athlete'' searches every year by advertising AF searches. We therefore repeat the analysis from Table 4 in Table 5 , but using only those departments that do not appear in the top 10 of any of our four rankings. This eliminates 16 departments from the data and reduces our sample size from 531 to 430. The results in Table 5 indicate that the magnitude of the effect of department rank has been diminished, but the coefficient is still negative and statistically significant. The coefficient estimate is -.0025 when we do not control for the number of positions in the ad and is -.0019 when we do control for number of positions. The only other variables that remain significant in the regression are whether or not the position advertised is joint with another department and the number of positions advertised in the announcement. 13 The coding of the positions variable required some subjective judgments. We found that while ads frequently indicated that one, two or three positions were available, it was extremely rare for more a number higher than three to be specified. On the other hand, terms such as "one or more positions," "two or more positions," and simply "positions" or "openings" were very common. We coded "one or more positions" as two positions. Listings specifying "two or more positions," "positions" or "openings" were coded as three or more positions. The very few advertisements that specified a number of positions greater than three were coded as three or more positions. It was our judgement that this coding best captured the intent of the ads.
The magnitude of the effect of rank on search scope is of modest, but very reasonable, magnitude. The coefficient estimates in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that a 10-place increase in department ranking is associated with 1.9 to 3.6 more subfields listed in a position search. It takes a difference in rank of 30 places to generate a difference in search scope equivalent to one of the major general fields (containing 6 to 9 subfields).
There is considerable debate over the extent to which department rankings reflect true department quality. In other words, quality rank is measured with error. If this is the case, then the coefficient estimate for quality ranking is attenuated towards zero and we underestimate the impact of quality ranking on search scope. One correction for measurement error would be to instrument the NRC ranking with a second measure of quality. If the measurement errors in the two quality measures are uncorrelated, this produces a consistent coefficient estimate. Of our three other rankings, we argue that the Scott and Mitias ranking is best-suited for this exercise. The US News ranking is, like the NRC ranking, a reputation-based ranking. Therefore, the measurement errors are likely to be correlated. The Dusansky and Vernon only includes fifty departments, substantially reducing our sample size. The Scott and Mitias ranking is publication-based, ranking departments by total pages in 36 journals from 1984-93 per faculty member, and available for all departments in the NRC ranking. The measurement error in the NRC ranking is most likely going to reflect the lag with which reputations adjust for departments that have improved or declined. In contrast, the measurement error in the Scott and Mitias ranking is more likely going to reflect factors such as high-quantity output in low-quality journals that contribute relatively little to reputation. Therefore, it seems likely that the two measurement errors are uncorrelated.
Instrumental variables (IV) estimation in linear models is very straightforward. In nonlinear models, however, IV estimation of errors-in-variables models fails to produce consistent coefficient estimates. Amemiya (1985) points out that econometric theory developed for nonlinear models with endogenous regressors is not applicable for nonlinear errors-in-variables models. Hausman, Newey and Powell (1995) implement IV estimation in the case of nonlinear errors-in-variables models with an additive error term, which does not apply to the case of the Tobit model. Carroll, Ruppert and Stefanski (1995) suggest that a useful approximation is obtained by estimating a generalized linear model in which the appropriate regressor is replaced with the predicted value from a first-stage regression on the alternative measurement. 14 Stefanski and Buzas (1995) show in a simulation study that this method substantially reduces bias due to measurement error in the case of logistic regression.
In Table 6 , we therefore report Tobit results in which the NRC ranking is replaced with the predicted value from a first-stage regression on the Scott and Mitias ranking and the other control variables. While we do not claim that these estimates are consistent, we do claim that they are subject to less measurement error bias than those reported in Tables 4 and 5 . The first column of Table 6 repeats the coefficient on NRC ranking from the Tobit regressions estimated in Tables 4 and 5. The second column reports the IV estimate. Instrumenting with the Scott and Mitias ranking increases the magnitude of the coefficient on NRC by a little over 30% in the full sample and by over 75% in the non-top10 sample. The NRC coefficients now range from -.0035 to -.0048. This suggests that a 10-place increase in department ranking is associated with 3.5 to 4.8 more subfields listed in a position search. A difference in ranking of 20 places generates a difference in search scope equivalent to a major general field (6 to 9 subfields).
We suspect that the inconsistency of our IV estimates due to the nonlinearity of the Tobit model is relatively small. We are able to almost exactly replicate the coefficients in Table 6 by 14 We also try a slight modification to this approximation that is also suggested by Carroll, Ruppert and Stefanski (1995) , but it had a negligible impact on the results.
setting the search scope measure to .8 for all AF searches and estimating OLS and linear IV regression models, suggesting that the nonlinearities in our model are relatively inconsequential.
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Additional IV analysis, not reported in the tables, shows that this relationship is much stronger for public universities than private universities. For private universities, a 10-place increase in department ranking is associated with 2.8 to 3.9 more subfields listed in a position search, while for public universities the equivalent response is 4.0 to 5.4 more subfields listed in a position search. This means that for public universities, a difference in rankings of only 15 places is enough to generate a difference in search scope equivalent to a major general field.
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that differences in search behavior across departments, with some departments engaging in very narrow searches and others engaging in very broad searches, are actually systematic differences that reflect economically rational behavior.
We would expect to see similar patterns in search behavior in other markets. For example, a moderately successful law firm might primarily recruit new employees from law firms in the local area, while a prestigious law firm with high quality standards is more likely to send out recruiters to campuses across the nation. In both cases, the search strategy is similar to that of the economics departments. The recruiters receive resumes from interested candidates and quickly selects (with little cost) those that exceed the firm's minimum quality threshold for (more costly)
interviewing. The more prestigious law firm will recruit at more campuses across a broader geographic area in order to insure that they find enough prospective employees that exceed their higher quality threshold.
15 Specifically, the coefficients from the OLS version of the first column of Table 6 are -.0033, -.0027, -.0025 and -.0021. The coefficients from the linear IV regression version of the second column of Table 5 are -.0045, -.0037, -.0043, and -.0035. A quick examination of Table 6 shows that these coefficients deviate no more than .0003 from the Tobit results. (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 2 ( )
